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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
and Jennifer A. Blackburn"
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This Article surveys administrative law developments in appellate
cases from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007. Only cases from the
Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have been
reviewed. As compared to prior years, the number of cases in which
administrative law principles played a significant role showed no upward
spike. There are many other topics that concern elements of administrative law, but this Article does not address cases containing those specific
subject matter topics. There is likely some duplication of cases among
the subject matter topics, but only the administrative law elements are
emphasized in this Article.
This Article begins with cases that concern standing to initiate certain
types of proceedings and then turns to the defenses and immunities
discussed in administrative law cases. Standards of review and the
effects of agency actions come next, and the last substantive topic
discussed is the ever-present question of a direct or discretionary appeal.
This Article finishes up with a recounting of the acts enacted by the
Georgia General Assembly in its 2007 regular session that affect the
composition and powers of administrative agencies.
II.

STANDING TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS

During this year's survey period, Georgia courts addressed the issue
of standing in two cases, one of which was also discussed in last year's
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article.' In Massey v.Butts County,2 the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the zoning decision
because he failed to demonstrate special damages.3 The plaintiff, a
property owner in Butts County, brought suit against Butts County, the
Butts County Board of Zoning Appeals, and a neighboring property
owner. The plaintiff alleged that a barn constructed on the neighbor's
property violated the County's zoning ordinance. The trial court granted
the neighbor's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the court of
appeals affirmed.4
On appeal to the supreme court, the court recognized two lines of cases
that addressed whether a property owner must show special damages to
challenge a zoning action on a neighboring property within the same
municipality.5 The plaintiff relied upon a string of cases that originated
in Snow v.Johnston,' in which the supreme court held that a property
owner has standing to seek injunctive relief from a zoning action and
does not need to show special damages when he or she resides in a
municipality with a zoning ordinance that restricts property use to
residential purposes.7 The defendants, however, cited Tate v. Stephens,' in which the supreme court held that a property owner must
demonstrate special damages in order to seek injunctive relief from a
zoning determination.9
In 1946 the General Assembly passed comprehensive zoning and
planning legislation for municipalities, which provided for judicial review
of a municipality's board of zoning adjustments decision to "[any person

1. See Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn, Administrative Law, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing Massey v. Butts County, 275 Ga. App. 478, 621 S.E.2d 479

(2005)).
2. 281 Ga. 244, 637 S.E.2d 385 (2006).
3. Id. at 245, 637 S.E.2d at 386.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943).
7. Massey, 281 Ga. at 245-46, 637 S.E.2d at 387 (citing Snow, 197 Ga. at 152, 28 S.E.2d
at 275). In Massey appellants asserted that Snow is controlling because it is the older
precedent. Id. at 246 n.2, 637 S.E.2d at 387 n.2. To support this assertion, they cited
Sowell v. Sowell, 212 Ga. 351, 92 S.E.2d 524 (1956), in which the court determined that
unless overruled, the earliest decision on a subject prevails. Massey, 281 Ga. at 246 n.2,
637 S.E.2d at 387 n.2 (citing Sowell, 212 Ga. at 353, 28 S.E.2d at 526). The supreme court,
however, dismissed the appellants' assertion and the holding in Sowell because the court
has since determined that the "'more persuasive'" rule is the one that appears later in
time. Massey, 281 Ga. at 246, 637 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting Houston v. Lowes of Savannah,
235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1975)).
8. 245 Ga. 519, 265 S.E.2d 811 (1980).
9. Massey, 281 Ga. at 246, 637 S.E.2d at 387 (citing Tate, 245 Ga. at 521, 265 S.E.2d
at 813)
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or persons who may have a substantial interest in any decision of the
board of adjustment."' ° Subsequently, the General Assembly also
allowed "[a]ny person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved" the right
to appeal the decisions of the board of zoning appeals." While the
legislature's "'substantial interest-aggrieved citizen"' test was only
statutorily applicable to judicial appeals from decisions of local boards
of adjustment or zoning appeals, the supreme court adopted this
standard for judicial appeals from zoning decisions rendered by all local
governing authorities. 2 Because Snow was decided prior to the 1946
zoning legislation, the court in Massey held that it was no longer
controlling precedent. 3 Therefore, the supreme court held that Tate,
which was decided after the zoning legislation was enacted, controlled
and required the plaintiff to establish a substantial interest in the
zoning decision and show special damages in order to have standing to
appeal. "
In a matter of first impression, the court of appeals determined that
a devisee's inchoate interest in real property may constitute a "substantial interest" and therefore allow standing to challenge a zoning decision
on neighboring property.'5 In Hollberg v. Spalding County, 6 the
appellant challenged the Spalding County Board of Commissioners'
grant of a special exception permit to rezone an adjacent parcel.' 7 In
order to challenge a zoning decision, a neighboring property owner must
establish standing under the "substantial interest-aggrieved citizen" test,
which requires (1) evidence of a substantial interest in the zoning
decision and (2) evidence of special damages not common to all similarly
situated property owners. 8 The neighboring property, the property
under which the appellant sought to establish standing, was devised to
the appellant as a life estate in his mother's will. However, when the
board of commissioners approved the special exception permit on

10. 1946 Ga. Laws 191, 198 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 69-827 (Harrison 1976)
(repealed 1976)). See Massey, 281 Ga. at 248, 637 S.E.2d at 388-89, for the court's
discussion explaining the demise of the statutory footing for the substantial interestaggrieved citizen test but the preservation of its judicial expansion.
11. 1964 Ga. Laws 259, 260 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1211.1 (Harrison 1976)
(repealed 1976)).
12. Massey, 281 Ga. at 247, 637 S.E.2d at 387 (citing Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga.
160, 161, 236 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1977)).
13. Id. at 247-48, 637 S.E.2d at 388.
14. Id. at 247, 637 S.E.2d at 388.
15. Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga. App. 768, 773, 637 S.E.2d 163, 169 (2006).
16. 281 Ga. App. 768, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006).
17. Id. at 769, 637 S.E.2d at 166.
18. Id. at 770, 637 S.E.2d at 167.
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September 23, 2004, the will was not yet settled. The appellees argued
that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the special
exception because the appellant did not hold title to the property at the
time the special exception was granted. 9 In deciding if the appellant
established 2standing,
the court applied the substantial interest-aggrieved
0
citizen test.
For the first prong of the test, the appellant asserted that he had a
substantial interest in the zoning decision by virtue of being a devisee
in his mother's will, which included the property adjacent to the rezoned
property.2' The court noted, "Whether a devisee of real property has a
substantial interest in a zoning decision so as to satisfy the first prong
of the test is a matter of first impression in [Georgia]." 2 2 The court
further noted that the probate rules establish that "'upon the death of
the owner of realty the devisees have an inchoate title in the realty,
which is perfected when the executor assents to the devise."' 23 The
court finally noted that this assent "'relates back to the date of death of
the testator. ' ' 24 Thus, the devise of the life estate, vested to the
appellant, relates back to the date of his mother's death, which was prior
Therefore, the court held
to the approval of the special exception.
that the appellant's inchoate title was sufficient to give him a substantial interest in the grant of the special exception.26
The second prong of the test required the appellant to show that "'his
property will suffer special damage as a result of the decision complained of rather than merely some damage which is common to all
property owners similarly situated.' 27 Expert testimony in the record
provided that the value of the land appreciated considerably since the
date the special exception was granted.2" Based on these findings, the
court affirmed the trial court's holding that the appellant failed to
establish standing under the substantial interest-aggrieved citizen
29
test.

19. Id. at 768-72, 637 S.E.2d at 165-68.
20. Id. at 772-75, 637 S.E.2d at 168-70.
21. Id. at 772, 637 S.E.2d at 168.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 772-73, 637 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 236 Ga. 133, 135,
223 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1976)).
24. Id. at 773, 637 S.E.2d at 168-69 (quoting Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 201, 223
S.E.2d 445, 448 (1976)).
25. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 169.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Brand v. Wilson, 252 Ga. 416, 417, 314 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1984)).
28. Id. at 775, 637 S.E.2d at 170.
29. Id.
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III.

AGENCY DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

The next three cases examine various agency defenses and immunities. In Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc.," the
supreme court held that the attorney-client privilege exception to the
Georgia Open Records Act 3' ("ORA") did not protect the commissioners'
The
executive session from a newspaper's open records request."
Bainbridge Post Searchlight (the "newspaper") challenged the commissioners' denial of its open records request for responses to grand jury
presentments that were reviewed in an executive session of the
commissioners' regularly scheduled meeting. 33
34
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 50-14-1(b)
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all meetings
3
[conducted by a public agency] shall be open to the public." However,
6
O.C.G.A. section 50-14-2(1)3 provides an exception for the attorneyclient privilege, stating that a meeting "may be closed in order to consult
and meet with legal counsel pertaining to pending or potential litigation., 37 The court warned that the attorney-client privilege exception
must be narrowly construed in order to uphold the legislative intent of
the ORA, which is to require public agencies to conduct open meetings." Because there was no "'pending or potential litigation,"' but
only proposed grand jury presentments, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to
the executive session.39
In a forceful dissent authored by Justice Melton and joined by Justice
Benham, Justice Melton rejected the majority's holding that the
information at issue was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 41 Unlike the majority, the dissent did not classify the presentments as "proposed."4' The presentments were prepared by the grand
jury and presented to the commissioners for review and response. The
responses would likely be used to determine the charges the grand jury

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

280 Ga. 706, 632 S.E.2d 113 (2006).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2006).
Decatur County, 280 Ga. at 708, 632 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 706, 632 S.E.2d at 115.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b) (2006).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2(1) (2006).
Id.
Decatur County, 280 Ga. at 707, 632 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 708, 632 S.E.2d at 116 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2(1)).
Id. at 709, 632 S.E.2d at 117 (Melton, J., dissenting).
Id.
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would pursue against the commissioners.42 The acts of reviewing and
responding to the presentments were "directly analogous to discovery in
a pending suit."43 Accordingly, the dissent argued that the attorneyclient privilege protected the presentments and allowed for a closed
meeting. 4
In Reece v. Turner,45 the court examined whether the appellants, as
employees of the Cobb County public school system, were entitled to
official immunity as provided in the Georgia constitution.46
The
appellee filed a damages claim against the appellants-all of whom were
employees in supervising roles at Pebblebrook High School ("Pebblebrook")-as a result of a nonparty's, Virgil Spaur, sexual molestation of
the appellee. 47 The court of appeals held that the appellants were
entitled to official immunity
on the damages claim, thereby reversing the
48
holding.
court's
trial
Georgia law provides that a public officer may be personally liable
only for a "ministerial act" negligently performed or a "discretionary act"
performed with malice or intent to injure. 49 The appellee presented no
evidence that the appellants acted with either actual malice or an actual
intent to cause injury." Therefore, the court held that unless the
appellee was able to establish that the appellants were performing
ministerial acts and not discretionary acts, the doctrine of official
immunity applied and barred the appellee's claim.5 1 A ministerial act
is defined as "'one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty."'52 A discretionary act is defined as one
that "'calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which
in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and
acting on them in a way not specifically directed."'53

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 284 Ga. App. 282, 643 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
46. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e).
47. Reece, 284 Ga. App. at 283, 643 S.E.2d at 816.
48. Id. at 288, 643 S.E.2d at 819.
49. Id. at 285, 643 S.E.2d at 816-17 (citing Harper v. Patterson, 270 Ga. App. 437, 440,
606 S.E.2d 887, 891 (2004)).
50. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 817.
51. Id.
52. Banks v. Happoldt, 271 Ga. App. 146, 149, 608 S.E.2d 741, 744 (2004) (quoting
Happoldt v. Kutscher, 256 Ga. App. 96, 98, 567 S.E.2d 380, 382 (2002)).
53. Id. (quoting Happoldt, 256 Ga. App. at 98, 567 S.E.2d at 382).
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The appellee claimed that the appellants negligently failed to
supervise her, as a student, and Spaur, as an employee, in a manner
sufficient to protect her from molestation.54 The court's well established precedent provided that "the making of decisions regarding the
supervision of students and school personnel is a discretionary function
requiring personal deliberation and judgment."5 As such, the court of
and held that the appellee's
appeals reversed the trial court's decision
56
claim was barred by official immunity.
In Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Department of Community Health, 7
the court of appeals examined the application of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act 5" ("GAPA") and the protection of sovereign immunity
for state agencies. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. ("Live Oak") brought an
action against the Department of Community Health (the "Department"),
seeking a declaratory judgment against the Department. The action
challenged the Department's interpretation of its rules concerning
contributions to state health insurance benefit plans. The Department
filed a motion for protective order, asserting that sovereign immunity
precluded the superior court's jurisdiction and that discovery should be
stayed. The trial court granted the Department's motion for protective
order to stay discovery, determining that sovereign immunity barred the
claim. On appeal, Live Oak contended that the trial court improperly
60
decided the matter pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 50-13-109 of GAPA.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity requires a trial court to address
a declaratory judgment action pursuant to GAPA. 6" The court warned,
"In no uncertain terms[,] '[O.C.G.A. section] 50-13-10 governs declaratory
judgment regarding the validity of administrative rules."'6 2 The plain
language of the statute provides, "The validity of any rule ... may be
determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that
the rule ... or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the

54. Reece, 284 Ga. App. at 285, 643 S.E.2d at 817.
55. Id. (citing Harper, 270 Ga. App. at 440, 606 S.E.2d at 891); see also Leake v.
Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219, 225, 617 S.E.2d 575, 580 (2005), overruled on other grounds by
Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007); Chamlee v. Henry County Bd. of
Educ., 239 Ga. App. 183, 184, 521 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1999); Perkins v. Morgan County Sch.
Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835-36, 476 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1996).
56. Reece, 284 Ga. App. at 288, 643 S.E.2d at 819.
57. 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).
58. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (2006).
59. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 (2006).
60. Live Oak Consulting, 281 Ga. App. at 791-94, 637 S.E.2d at 456-58.
61. Id. at 794-95, 637 S.E.2d at 458-59.
62. Id. at 795, 637 S.E.2d at 459 (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Peach Hill Props., 280 Ga.
624, 625, 631 S.E.2d 660, 661 (2006)).
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legal rights of the petitioner."63 The statute also provides specific
procedural guidelines for filing such an action, which include a
requirement that the action be filed in the Superior Court of Fulton
County or in the superior court of the county of residence of the
petitioner. 4 These statutory provisions clearly provide the prescribed
terms and conditions under which the state consents to be sued based
on a challenge to an agency's rule or regulation. 5
Nevertheless, Live Oak argued that the "may be determined" language
in the statute is evidence that the statute is only one of several methods
by which one may challenge the validity of an agency rule.66 The court
disagreed and observed that "'[u]nder the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent.' ' 67 Furthermore, the Georgia constitution "provides that the State's immunity 'can
only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically
provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of
such waiver.' ' 6' Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of the Department's motion for protective order, holding
that the trial court properly applied GAPA to the action and correctly
concluded that sovereign immunity protects the state agency from a
declaratory judgment action.6 9
The next case mandates strict compliance with statutory filing
provisions for actions against state agencies. In Gladowski v. Department of Family & Children Services,70 the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court's finding that the petition for judicial review was not
timely filed. 7' Sylvia Gladowski filed an appeal from a Department of
Family and Children Services (the "Department") ruling that determined
Gladowski improperly transferred assets to qualify for Medicaid
coverage.72 Under O.C.G.A. section 49-4-153(c),73 an aggrieved party
may obtain judicial review of a final decision of a department "by filing
a petition within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the

63. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10(a).
64. Id. § 50-13-10(b).
65. Live Oak Consulting, 281 Ga. App. at 795, 637 S.E.2d at 459.
66. Id. at 795-96, 637 S.E.2d at 459.
67. Id. at 796, 637 S.E.2d at 459 (quoting State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429,430,
437 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1993)).
68. Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449, 452, 578
S.E.2d 110, 113 (2003)).
69. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 459-60.
70. 281 Ga. App. 299, 635 S.E.2d 886 (2006).
71. Id. at 302, 635 S.E.2d at 889.
72. Id. at 299-300, 635 S.E.2d at 887-88.
73. O.C.G.A. § 49-4-153(c) (2006).
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commissioner."7 4 The court of appeals determined that the date of
service is the date the final decision was mailed by the agency, not the
date it was received. 75 "'When an appeal of an adverse decision by an
administrative agency is filed beyond the time allowed by law the
superior court has no jurisdiction to take any action other than to
dismiss the case.' '7 ' Because Gladowski filed outside of the thirty-day
statutory period, the court held that the superior court properly
dismissed her claim.77
Similarly, in Perdue v. Athens Technical College,78 the court of
appeals demanded strict compliance with statutory ante litem notice
requirements. 79 The court held that the appellant failed to properly
comply with the notice provisions of O.C.G.A. section 50-21-26(a)80 and
was thereby barred from pursuing the claim against the state.8 ' While
the appellant provided ante litem notice to the proper party by certified
letter, the letter did not set forth the specific amount of the claim as
required under O.C.G.A. section 50-21-26(a)(5)(E). 8' In reaching its
decision, the court noted that in Howard v. State,s" when the plaintiff
provided ante litem notice to the insurance agent, but not directly to the
state entity, the notice was "'obviously deficient."'8 4 The court in
Perdue further noted that in Dempsey v. Board of Regents,8' the court
held the notice deficient because it was not based on the claimant's
knowledge and belief, and it was not delivered properly.8 6 Based on the
substantial body of case law requiring strict compliance with ante litem
notice provisions, the court in Perdue held that the appellant's failure to
properly state the amount of the claim was a fatal omission, the ante
litem notice was deficient, and the claim was barred. 7

74. Id.
75. Gladowski, 281 Ga. App. at 300, 635 S.E.2d at 888.
76. Id. at 302-03,635 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Miller v. Ga. Real Estate Comm'n, 136 Ga.
App. 718, 719, 222 S.E.2d 183, 183 (1975)).
77. Id. at 303, 635 S.E.2d at 889.
78. 283 Ga. App. 404, 641 S.E.2d 631 (2007).
79. Id. at 407, 641 S.E.2d at 633.
80. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) (2006).
81. Perdue, 283 Ga. App. at 408, 641 S.E.2d at 634.
82. Id. at 406, 641 S.E.2d at 633 (applying O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E)).
83. 226 Ga. App. 543, 487 S.E.2d 112 (1997).
84. Perdue, 283 Ga. App. at 406, 641 S.E.2d at 633 (quoting Howard, 283 Ga. App. at
544, 487 S.E.2d at 114).
85. 256 Ga. App. 291, 568 S.E.2d 154 (2002).
86. Perdue, 283 Ga. App. at 407, 641 S.E.2d at 633 (citing Dempsey, 256 Ga. App. at
293, 568 S.E.2d at 156).
87. Id. at 408, 641 S.E.2d at 634.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY DECISIONS
8

In Farrarv. Georgia Board of Examiners of Psychologists, a novel
twist on the "any evidence rule" was presented to the court of appeals.
Farrar had received six months probation in a disciplinary proceeding
before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The State Board of
Examiners of Psychologists (the "Board") reviewed the findings and the
punishment levied by the ALJ, and it increased the punishment.8 9
Subsequent to the final agency decision, Farrar appealed to the
superior court and specifically questioned whether sufficient evidence
supported the increase in his punishment. The superior court was not
sympathetic, and it affirmed the Board's decision.9 °
Upon filing an appeal to the court of appeals, a strange procedural
twist developed. The transcripts from both the hearing held before the
ALJ and the subsequent hearing before the Board were not in the record
transmitted to the court of appeals, and the clerk of the superior court
apparently told the clerk of the court of appeals that no transcripts were
in the superior court clerk's possession. 91 The appellate court interpreted the situation to mean that the superior court had issued an order
without the entire record of the evidence before it.9 2 Thus, the court of

appeals vacated and remanded the case with direction to reconsider the
appeal made previously by Farrar.9 3 Apparently, for purposes of
review, the any evidence standard requires a reviewing court to consider
all the evidence.
Piedmont Healthcare,Inc. v. Georgia Department of Human Resources 94 presented the court of appeals with a good appellate case for the
discussion of a summary determination under administrative rules.
Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. ("Piedmont") wished to consolidate its Atlanta
and Fayette County facilities under a single hospital permit. The Office
of Regulatory Services ("ORS") denied Piedmont's application for
consolidation. 95
Piedmont appealed and obtained a hearing before an ALJ. Piedmont
and the ORS both moved for summary determination, which is roughly
an administrative equivalent to filing a motion for summary judgment.

88.
89.

280 Ga. App. 455, 634 S.E.2d 79 (2006).
Id. at 455, 634 S.E.2d at 80.

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 456, 634 S.E.2d at 80.
Id., 634 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 456-57, 634 S.E.2d at 81.
282 Ga. App. 302, 638 S.E.2d 447 (2006).
Id. at 302, 638 S.E.2d at 448.
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The ALJ determined that a hearing was unnecessary because no
questions of fact remained and awarded a summary determination to the
ORS.98
Upon Piedmont's appeal for a final agency decision by the Department
of Human Resources ("DHR"), the DHR affirmed the ALJ's decision.
Subsequently, Piedmont brought the matter to superior court, and it was
affirmed.
Bringing the issue before the court of appeals, Piedmont argued that
questions of fact remained, and therefore summary determination should
not have been issued. Piedmont argued that a hearing should have been
held in order to introduce and resolve issues of fact.98 In much the
same fashion as an appellate review of a grant of summary judgment,
the court of appeals proceeded to review the law and evidence to assess
whether factual issues remained.9 9 To Piedmont's detriment, the court
ruled that the so-called evidence Piedmont would have presented at the
hearing was really just a statement that Piedmont could have introduced
However, Piedmont had moved for summary
additional facts.'0 0
determination, and although Piedmont claimed to have additional facts
that it could have introduced at a hearing, the facts were not included
in its motion.' 0°
When the ORS originally reviewed Piedmont's permit application, it
ruled that Piedmont did not meet the proximity requirement of a single
permit because of the distance between the two facilities and the
resulting difficulty that the facilities would have in sharing resources.
In subsequent rulings, the ALJ and appeals reviewer also found that the
two facilities were simply not in close proximity.' 2 Ultimately, the
court of appeals deferred to the ORS's conclusions because, the court
noted, courts must show deference to an agency's interpretation.' ° 3
existed, the court of appeals
Concluding that no issues of material fact
°4
affirmed the summary determination.
Agency deference was also an issue in Department of Community
Pruitt Corporation ("Pruitt") had purchased
Health v. Pruitt Corp.'

96. Id. at 303, 638 S.E.2d at 448. The administrative rule allowing the summary
determination is GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 616-1-2-.15 (2004).
97. Piedmont Healthcare, 282 Ga. App. at 303, 638 S.E.2d at 448.
98. Id. at 305, 638 S.E.2d at 449.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 306, 638 S.E.2d at 450.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 306-07, 638 S.E.2d at 450-51.
104. Id. at 307, 638 S.E.2d at 451.
105. 284 Ga. App. 888, 645 S.E.2d 13 (2007).
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a nursing facility from Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). The nursing
facility participated in the Medicaid program. It used the per diem rate,
a special manner of calculating the amounts to be paid by the Medicaid
program to a nursing facility. The calculation, as applied to a nursing
facility having different owners within the same fiscal year, depended
upon the submission of cost reports for the intervals of ownership.' 0 6
Because Pruitt had only owned the nursing facility for two months
when it filed its initial cost report, the Department of Community
Health (the "Department") relied on IHS's cost reports. This reliance
produced an applicable per diem rate substantially lower than that
determined by Pruitt during its two months or by IHS for the preceding
ten months of ownership during the fiscal year. In interpreting its own
policy and procedures manual, the Department actually used IHS's cost
report from the preceding full fiscal year, as it was the
"'last approved
10 7
cost report"' under the Department's interpretation.
Pruitt obtained an administrative review of the per diem rate
computation, and the ALJ reversed. The ALJ concluded that "'last
approved cost report"' was an ambiguous phrase, and therefore, Pruitt
should receive the benefit of a favorable interpretation. The Department
sought a final agency decision from the commissioner, who reversed the
ALJ's ruling. The commissioner opined that last approved cost report
permissibly equated the term "approved" with the term "audited."
Because the Department only conducted audits after the end of the fiscal
year, it correctly figured the per diem rate based on the audited cost
report from the last full year of ownership by IHS. 08
Pruitt continued the proceedings by taking the matter to the superior
court. The superior court reversed the commissioner's decision and
agreed with the ALJ. The Department then took the matter to the court
of appeals.'o 9
The appellate court examined the final agency decision rendered by
the commissioner and held that the superior court had erred."0 Using
the standard in O.C.G.A. section 50-13-19(h)(5),"1 the court concluded
that the evidence (albeit conflicting) supported the commissioner's
decision, and therefore the decision was not clearly erroneous.'12 By
restoring the decision of the ALJ, the superior court had not given

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 888-89, 645 S.E.2d at 14.
Id., 645 S.E.2d at 14-15.
Id. at 888-90, 645 S.E.2d at 14-15.
Id. at 890, 645 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 892, 645 S.E.2d at 17.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)(5) (2006).
See Pruitt,284 Ga. App. at 892, 645 S.E.2d at 16-17.
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proper deference to the Department's interpretation of its own policies
and procedures manual.'1 3 Because the Department's interpretation
was not unreasonable, the court of appeals reversed the superior court's
judgment. 114
The last case in this section is City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian
School, Inc."' Fellowship Christian School, Inc. ("Fellowship") wished
to build school facilities and included a new football stadium in its
application for a conditional use permit. The planning commission for
Roswell recommended to the city government that the permit be
approved, but ultimately, the approval obtained from the city did not
include the new football stadium.11
Instead of initiating a proceeding confined strictly to an appeal of the
issuance of the permit without the stadium contained therein, Fellowship filed in superior court for a writ of mandamus to compel the mayor
and the city council to issue the permit as originally filed. The trial
court issued the writ, and the city appealed through the discretionary
appeal process. 7
The supreme court, in setting the ground rules for the review, noted
that a city ordinance gives the mayor and the city council discretion in
deciding how to act on a permit application."' When discretion is
present, a writ of mandamus is only proper if the discretion is grossly
abused."' If any evidence supports20 the mayor and council's decision,
the exercise of discretion is proper.
The mayor and council, under the applicable statutes, did have
discretion to consider several different factors that might influence a
One factor was whether the
decision on a permit application.' 2 '
planned buildings and stadium would result in an increase in traffic
without a plan for resolving such a problem.'22 The supreme court
noted that there were two other high school stadiums within a mile of
Fellowship's location and that Fellowship's traffic study showed that the
stadium would exacerbate heavy traffic conditions.' 23 This evidence

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 891, 645 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 891-92, 645 S.E.2d at 16-17.
281 Ga. 767, 642 S.E.2d 824 (2007).
Id. at 767, 642 S.E.2d at 825.
Id.
Id. at 768, 642 S.E.2d at 825.

119. Id. (quoting Jackson County v. Earth Res., Inc., 280 Ga. 389, 390, 627 S.E.2d 569,
571 (2006)).
120. Id. (citing Jackson County, 280 Ga. at 391, 627 S.E.2d at 571).
121. See id. at 769, 642 S.E.2d at 826 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-67-3(4) (2006)).
122. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-67-3(4)).
123. Id.
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was enough to support the exercise of discretion in decision-making by
the mayor and the council, and the superior court's judgment was reversed. 124
V.

EFFECTS OF AGENCY ACTIONS

The decision in Departmentof Transportationv. Peach Hill Properties,
Inc.121 illustrates what happens when a party does not follow instructions. In a prior appearance of this matter, the supreme court held in
favor of Peach Hill Properties ("Peach Hill"). 126 In that prior appearance, Peach Hill had applied for an exemption to develop a landfill near
a regional airport. The Department of Transportation (the "Department") would not submit the matter to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), so Peach Hill sought relief in superior court. The superior
court ordered the Department to submit the matter. 127 The supreme
court held the order to be an abuse of discretion. 128 However, Peach
Hill obtained relief by a directed remand which stated that the superior
court could develop guidelines that would allow129Peach Hill to seek the
previously requested exemption from the FAA.
When the superior court received the directions from the supreme
court in the prior case, it entered an order to direct the actions of the
Department, which then adopted a new rule to cover circumstances such
as those in this case. 3 ' However, the second prong of the directions
given by the supreme court in the prior case stated that the superior
court could mandate that Peach Hill be given administrative considerordinary land use
ation of its request for an exemption from the
31
contemplated for the area surrounding airports.'
Peach Hill did not proceed under the original land use request for an
exemption but amended the previously filed action to request a
declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus seeking to throw out
parts of the new rule. The trial court agreed with Peach Hill and
ordered the Department to adopt a new rule. The Department appealed
132
to the supreme court for the second round of appellate review.

124. Id. at 769, 642 S.E.2d at 826.
125. 280 Ga. 624, 631 S.E.2d 660 (2006).
126. Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Peach Hill Props., Inc., 278 Ga. 198, 201, 599 S.E.2d 167,
170 (2004).
127. Id. at 198-200, 599 S.E.2d at 168-69.
128. Id. at 201, 599 S.E.2d at 169.
129. Id.
130. Peach Hill Props., 280 Ga. at 625, 631 S.E.2d at 661.
131. Id. at 624, 631 S.E.2d at 661.
132. Id. at 625, 631 S.E.2d at 661.
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The Department argued that declaratory judgment should not be
rendered on the new rule because Peach Hill had no application for the
proposed landfill on file. Thus, the Department argued that there was
no need for an exemption from the ordinary land use permitted within
the vicinity of the regional airport. 13 3 Even in the administrative
arena, where one may easily seek a declaratory judgment regarding
whether a rule is valid, an actual controversy between parties must
exist, or a proposal is simply one for an advisory opinion."' Because
Peach Hill did not rely upon a land use application when seeking an
exemption under the new rule, a declaratory
judgment was not needed,
15
and the trial court's decision was reversed.
Vidalia onions were the underlying reason for the filing of a mandamus action in the next case, Bland Farms, LLC v. GeorgiaDepartment
of Agriculture."6 Vidalia onions are protected under state law, but
some growers took that protection further by labeling their onions as
"Certified Sweet" or some similar additional designation by trademark. 1 7
Bland Farms brought a mandamus action against the
Department of Agriculture (the "Department") to compel the agency head
to force the rival onion producers to stop using additional labels. The
trial court refused to issue the writ, and Bland Farms appealed.'38
The supreme court reviewed the statutory enactment but concluded
that no duties exist under the law that control or dictate to the
Department how it must specifically carry out the law. 3 9 According
to the court, the general authority conferred is to protect the Vidalia
trademark and is not to dictate any uniform way of implementation
among the different onion producers."'
The court noted that the
manner of implementing the regulatory framework and enforcing its
provisions involves the exercise of discretion.'
Because Bland Farms
did not question whether such discretion had been exercised but only
questioned the manner in which it had been exercised,
the court held
42
that the grant of a mandamus was not proper.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
sections
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 626, 631 S.E.2d at 662.
Id.
Id. at 626-27, 631 S.E.2d at 662.
281 Ga. 192, 637 S.E.2d 37 (2006).
Id. at 192, 637 S.E.2d at 38-39. The statutory protection is found at O.C.G.A.
2-14-130 to -137 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
Bland Farms, 281 Ga. at 192, 637 S.E.2d at 39.
Id. at 193, 637 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
Id. at 194, 637 S.E.2d at 39.
Id. at 194-95, 637 S.E.2d at 40.
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DIRECT OR APPLICATION TO APPEAL

Whether there is a legal right to appeal or whether a party must file
for a discretionary appeal in the Georgia appellate courts continues to
be a source of consternation to litigants. Determining if there is an
underlying subject matter that requires an application for appeal is not
always clear from an analysis of a case at the trial court level. This
issue was illustrated in a case involving state school superintendent
Kathy Cox, whose appeal was dismissed in Cox v. Academy of Lithonia,
Inc. 143
The Georgia State Board of Education and the Georgia Department of
Education (of which Ms. Cox is the head) rejected the Academy of
Lithonia's (the "Academy") application for a multi-year extension of its
charter. Instead of a two-year or three-year extension, only a one-year
extension was granted. In response, the Academy filed an original
action in superior court for a declaratory judgment that the renewal
term should be a minimum of two years. The trial court ruled in favor
of the Academy. The trial court reasoned that the governing local board
of education gave the Academy a two-year extension before it sent the
14 4
matter to the state board of education.
Cox filed a direct appeal, and the Academy filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to file an application for discretionary appeal. 45 The court
of appeals agreed with the Academy and entered an order of dismissal,
holding that the subject matter of the case involved an administrative
decision, which was rendered by the state board of education. 14 While
the court of appeals discussed distinguishing factors in two prior cases
containing similar fact patterns, which were successfully maintained in
the appellate courts, 47 it appears to this author that the real mistake
took place in the trial court. Although it is not apparent from Academy
of Lithonia, a defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
would likely have been successful in superior court to obtain the
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action or, depending upon the
4
timeframe, to convert the matter to an administrative appeal.'

143. 280 Ga. App. 626, 628, 634 S.E.2d 778, 780 (2006).
144. Id. at 626, 634 S.E.2d at 779.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The cases discussed were Departmentof Transportationv. Peach Hill Properties,
278 Ga. 198, 599 S.E.2d 167 (2004) (which is contained in section V of this Article) and Best
Tobacco v. Departmentof Revenue, 269 Ga. App. 484, 604 S.E.2d 578 (2004).
148. The court in Academy of Lithonia mentioned this in passing. 280 Ga. App. at 628,
634 S.E.2d at 780.
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Can an available writ of certiorari to the superior court be considered
a mandatory appeal for purposes of exhaustion of administrative
remedies? The tip of that iceberg was revealed in Jordan v. City of
Atlanta.'4 9 Jordan and a coworker, both city employees, were victims
of a reduction-in-force ordinance and were terminated. They appealed
to the Service Board, which denied relief. They then filed an original
action in superior court, but the court granted the City's motion to
dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
all of their
150
administrative remedies for the adverse determination.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, but for a different reason
than that contained in the conclusions of the trial court.15 To support
its argument that Jordan failed to exhaust all of her administrative
remedies, the City contended that the Atlanta, Georgia, Code of
Ordinances section 114-554... gives separated employees, such as
Jordan, two administrative remedies: (1) the right to appeal to the
Service Board and (2) the right to take the matter to superior court after
a final decision by the board.'5 3 The court of appeals disagreed and
observed that the only administrative remedy that section 114-554
grants to separated employees is the right to appeal to the Service
Board. 5 4 The court of appeals further observed that while section 114554 does make reference to the right to seek judicial review of the
board's final decision, that right is only available to parties that have
already "exhausted all administrative remedies available before the
board."'55 As such, the only actual right given to Jordan by section
114-554 was the right to appeal to the Service Board, and the court held
that her appeal constituted the exhaustion of all administrative
remedies.' 56
The court of appeals went further and reviewed whether the motion
to dismiss should have been granted because Jordan did not pursue a
writ of certiorari to the superior court.'57 Because the writ of certiorari
was the proper legal remedy for the superior court to correct any error
committed by the Service Board and because neither Jordan nor her

149.
150.
151.

283 Ga. App. 285, 641 S.E.2d 275 (2007).
Id. at 285, 641 S.E.2d at 276.
Id.

152.

ATLANTA,

GA.,

CODE OF

ORDINANCES

§ 114-554 (Municode through 2007

legislation).
153. Jordan, 283 Ga. App. at 285, 641 S.E.2d at 276.
154. Id. at 285-86, 641 S.E.2d at 276.
155. Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 114554).
156. Id. at 286, 641 S.E.2d at 276.
157. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 277.
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coworker filed a writ of certiorari within the applicable time limit, the
Service Board's order became final and deprived the superior court of
subject matter jurisdiction.'5 8 On that basis, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss.159
VII.

RECENT LEGISLATION

The 2007 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly contained
no major changes for executive branch agencies or for administrative law
principles. Only nine enactments contained agency changes, and they
were as follows:
1. Extensions
were given to several agricultural commodity commis0
sions; 16
2. The Jekyll Island State Park Authority was extended for forty more
years, and the Jekyll Island State Park Authority Oversight Committee
was created;' 6 '
3. The Georgia Public Defender Standards Council left the judicial
branch62 and is now a part of the executive branch of state government;

1

4. A Charter Advisory Committee on charter schools is now a part of
the Georgia Department of Education; 63
5. The Georgia Criminal Justice Improvement Council was repealed;"6
6. There is a new Georgia Commission on Hearing Impaired and Deaf

Persons ;165
7. A Georgia
Trauma Care Network Commission joined the list of
66
agencies;1
8. Georgia now has a Newborn Umbilical Cord Blood Bank and a
Georgia Commission for Saving the Cure;'67 and

158. Id. at 286-87, 641 S.E.2d at 277.
159. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 277.
160. Ga. S. Bill 165, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 2-8-13 (2000)).
161. Ga. H.R. Bill 214, §§ 3-5, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 12-3-232, -233, 234 (2006)).
162. Ga. S. Bill 139, §§ 1-4, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-1, -10.1, -26,
-30 (2004)).
163. Ga. S. Bill 39, § 5, Reg. Sess. (2007) (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2063.1 (Supp.
2007)).
164. Ga. H.R. Bill 220, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2007) (repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 28-8-1 to -3 (2003)).
165. Ga. H.R. Bill 655, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 30-1-5 (2003)).
166. Ga. S. Bill 60, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2007) (enacting new O.C.G.A. §§ 31-11-100 to -103
(Supp. 2007)).
167. Ga. S. Bill 148, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2007) (enacting new O.C.G.A. §§ 31-46-1 to -5
(Supp. 2007)).
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9. The State Licensing Board for Residential and General Contractors
6
has a reshuffled board, and in part, new appointment procedures. '

168. Ga. H.R. Bill 224, §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 43-41-3, -4
(2005)).

